JINSA Report #551 Port Insecurity

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February 22, 2006

JINSA Report #551

Port Insecurity

Grant the President this: There is more than a little anti-Arab
sentiment in the uproar over a Dubai firm purchasing the British
operating company running terminals at six major American seaports.
Otherwise, how do you explain the LACK of concern over Chinese companies
running terminals at two major West Coast ports and New Orleans, the
locus of much of our energy imports? Or about the original British
company when there are probably as many jihadists in Britain today as
there are in Dubai? Yesterday, the Department of Homeland Security was
still trying to figure out the ownership of terminal management in all
361 U.S. ports.

The Coast Guard does, and will continue to do, port security and the
tracking of ships, crews and cargo. The Customs Service does, and will
continue to do, screening in the ports. The real problem is twofold -
and applies to ALL foreign terminal ownership: first, that a management
company could facilitate infiltration of people or weapons into the
U.S.; and second that company officials would be briefed on American
security procedures which, if given to terrorists, would make security
much easier to breech.

There are two ancillary, but also real problems. The Dubai company is
government-owned. The current government of the UAE is pro-American, but
change in the Middle East is nerve-wracking at best. Second, the company
runs terminals in places including Venezuela - having a Middle Eastern
company control both ends where one end is increasingly close to Iran is
even more problematic.

We are indebted to Advisory Board Member Stephen Bryen, a former
Pentagon official, for pointing out that American defense companies with
partial foreign ownership are required to have an American Security
Board responsible for issues which, if controlled by foreign interests -
even allied interests - would make Americans nervous. Accepting the
rules and the authority of the Security Board is part of the deal. No
Board, no deal. More than one sale fell through on that point, which is
just fine with us.

Ports are not military installations, but they are considered "critical
infrastructure" under an Executive Order signed by President George H.W.
Bush. So why not have American Security Boards for all of America's
ports? Why not prevent Chinese, Danish, Singaporean, South Korean and
British as well as Dubai owners from getting an inside look at American
security practices?

The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) points out that not
only do American ports handle 95 percent of America's overseas commerce
and 10 million cruise passengers annually, "They also enable deployment
of U.S. military vessels, personnel and cargo to support our troops in
Iraq and Afghanistan, while ensuring the ability of relief organizations
to ship critical supplies to areas of the world hard hit by man-made and
natural disasters, such as the tsunami catastrophe… 16 million jobs...
$2 trillion worth of international trade annually... 27 percent of the
nation's GDP."

You'd think we'd want to protect all that and not only from Dubai. It's
time to have a real policy to protect the management of our ports from
all foreign ownership.

To view this JINSA Report online click on the link below.
http://www.jinsa.org/JINSAReports/3344

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