AJC Mideast Briefing

We Were not (Entirely) Alone: As UN Security Council Resolution 1701 Comes into Force, A Paradoxical New Paradigm Faces a Supreme Test A Special Report on Israeli and Middle-Eastern Affairs August 16, 2006 Dr. Eran Lerman Director Israel/Middle East Office Events and choices over the last few days have helped bring into focus the most significant, and least understood, aspect of this conflict—namely, the multilateral nature of the crisis: The text of UNSCR 1701, which squarely places the blame for initiating the recent war on Hezbollah; Israel's decision to accept it—coupled with the wink and a nod we received from the international community, giving the IDF the sixty hours it asked for to consolidate control over large parts of southern Lebanon; In the not-so-distant background, the arrests in Pakistan, Britain, and Italy, and the manner in which President George W. Bush overtly linked them to the struggle in Lebanon. A paradoxical new reality is at work, setting a policy paradigm that few Israelis would have thought possible even a year ago, but now comes the ultimate test of its viability. Israel fought to fend for herself, to protect the life and limb of her citizens, and to restore her deterrence; but it did so in the context of an array of forces, too loose to be called a "coalition," and yet real enough to make difference, and to leave its mark on the way Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz, Foreign Minister Tzippi Livni, and, in fact, the IDF high command (a much more sophisticated entity then usually conjured up by the careless talk about "generals' and the "military") made their decisions. There was, of course, the American administration, which may not have been "complicit" in the sinister and phantasmagoric sense conjured up by the likes of Seymour Hersh (who saw this as a contrived "trial run" for the assault on Iran); but did come to accept, early on—as did Tony Blair's Britain—that much more was at stake than the local balance of power on Israel's northern border. Their position left their mark on the G-8 positions stated in St. Petersburg early on. There were also significant players in the international arena, most notably France (and now Italy) as well as Turkey, whose governments may not share the general outlook of Bush or Blair, let alone Israel, but for whom the implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1559 and 1680, the removal of Syrian direct or indirect control in Lebanon, and effective restraints on the rise of Islamist totalitarians in another key foothold on the Mediterranean shores (following the Hamas win in January 2006) were essential to their reading of their own self-interest. Hence the almost surprisingly robust stand taken by the EU. Then there were, most interestingly of all, the moderate Arab states, led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia (whose antipathy toward the Shi'a terrorists was particularly palpable), and Jordan, whose initial reactions toward the Hezbollah provocation of July 12 were overtly angry and continue to be reflected in the ultimate language endorsed by UNSCR 1701. Among them, despite the fragility of their position and the danger of effective countermeasures by Hezbollah and by Syria's agents in Lebanon, were the forces represented by Lebanese Prime Minister Fu'ad Siniora and the late Rafik Hariri coalition—who were, all along, through various channels, both interlocutors and future implementers of any viable alternative to the prewar realities in the south. The bitter reactions to the tragedy in Qana (which may well have been deliberately manipulated by Hezbollah; but let there be no mistake about the scope of real suffering by Lebanese innocents, caught in the horrifying reality of terrorists digging in and firing at Israel in their midst) threatened to disrupt this front. It troubled U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice; it inflamed opinions in the Arab world and among many in the Muslim world; it caused revulsion and anger in Europe, where many parroted slogans about "disproportionate response," as if a war such as this were a parlor game. But as the conflict intensified again, the interests of the various elements cohered once again, leading to the dramatic events of the last few days. At this endgame, contrary to common perceptions, two elements complemented each other: on one hand, the Israeli decision to extend the military presence of the IDF northwards; on the other, the international call for a ceasefire and the promise of an interim force augmenting UNIFIL and helping the Lebanese Army deploy to the south, which it has refused to do for far too long. The IDF and the Israeli government, after all, were never eager to be drawn into a prolonged stay in Lebanese territory—least of all Prime Minister Olmert, whose speech to the Knesset on Monday, as the ceasefire took hold, included a reference to the resilience of the economy, indicating that he was all along attuned to this aspect of the national balance (or to the needs of the Tel Aviv "bubble" and the Stock Exchange, as less charitable voices are whispering). Thus, it was essential all along to have both Siniora's government and a future international presence as part of the vision for the postwar order. But will this work? Upon the answer to this question rest now not only vital aspects of the regional balance, but also the prospects of Olmert's political survival, let alone the implementation of his political agenda. The new dispensation now needs to prove that it can achieve the two minimal requirements without which the fighting that has ceased on Monday morning, August 14, will only be a prelude to far more terrible events: The need, openly stated by the Lebanese government itself, to arrange for the departure of Hezbollah's fighters from the zone of the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL's new deployment—or else we shall find them digging in again in their midst and under their cover. The implementation of the provisions in UNSCR 1701 dealing with the prevention of resupply by Iran and Syria of weapons (including long-range missiles) to Hezbollah. No Israeli government can survive if it allows the people of the north, once again, to be put again under an extended threat. Meanwhile, with the gains on the ground, bought at such a bitter price (but a distinctly smaller one than some of the naysayers predicted), a prospect opened up of Israel working, in complex and subtle ways, in coordination with other elements of this array of forces, so as to create a new strategic reality in Lebanon and beyond. At the end of the day, what made this possible was the selfless sacrifice of well over a hundred soldiers and dozens of civilians killed—158 lives lost in all, four of them from my little home town here. Again the terrible long shadow of Siegfried Sassoon's lines falls upon our lives: Shoulder to aching shoulder, side by side, They trudged away from life's broad wealds of light .

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