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August 14, 2006
JINSA Report #594
Security Council Resolution 1701
"Words, words, words. I.m so sick of words," said Eliza Doolittle. She might
have been working for the UN. UNSCR 1701, like most UN documents, is not a bad
representation of what should be done (the words are fine). But like most UN
documents, it falls miles short on the implementation of its mandates.
Responsibility for the war is placed squarely on Hizbullah. The UN
demands "the immediate cessation by Hizbullah of all attacks and the immediate
cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations," leaving room for
Israeli defense and retaliation. This is important in conjunction with a later
paragraph. Operating Paragraph 2 notes that only upon the full cessation of
hostilities will the government of Lebanon and UNIFIL deploy to the south. And
only at that point will Israel be asked to withdraw in parallel to the
Lebanese/UN deployment. It leaves room for understanding that the "defanging"
of Hizbullah - one of Israel's strategic goals - might be done by Israel rather
than by and Lebanese/UN force.
The abduction of two Israeli soldiers is referred to as a "cause" of
the war to be redressed immediately - also one of Israel's strategic goals.
Lebanese prisoners and Shebaa farms are deliberately and specifically aside for
later.
The absence of Lebanese government control of its territory - and
Hezbollah's establishment of a "state within a state" as Arafat had done before
- is named as the root of the crisis. The UN calls for the exercise of "full
sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the
government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of
Lebanon." OP 3-8 all insist that Lebanon behave like a sovereign government and
that other countries (Iran and Syria, though not mentioned by name) stop
sending arms and materiel into the country; two more of Israel's strategic
goals.
The Resolution corrects the shortcomings of UNIFIL, calling for a "UN
force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and
scope of operation" to enable it to "take all necessary action in areas of
deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure
that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any
kind." Not a goal, but not a bad thing.
So, all in all, it.s not bad, right? Wrong. Wrong. Wrong.
There is no mechanism, except continued fighting by Israel, to disarm Hizbullah
- and Nasrallah (apparently under pressure from Iran) has already changed his
mind about even paying lip service to the ceasefire. There is no mechanism,
except continued fighting by Israel, to close the Syrian/Iranian supply lines
into Lebanon. There is no mechanism, except continued fighting by Israel, to
force Hizbullah to return the two soldiers. UN Security Council members can pat
themselves on the back for their words, but the awful work of fighting to
redeem the captives, end the barrage of rockets, and bring sovereignty to
Lebanon, is left to Israel and the IDF with no real help from Turtle Bay.
To view this JINSA Report online click on the link below.
http://www.jinsa.org/JINSAReports/3513
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