| | A Narrow Passage: A Policy-Design Challenge for Israel and the West:
Demonstrating the Cost of the Hamas Vote while Avoiding a Humanitarian Crisis
A Weekly Briefing on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs
February 20, 2006 Dr. Eran Lerman
Director Israel/Middle East Office A narrow mountain path winds its way between dangerous cliffs; a step too long, a step too short, and a sharp slide awaits the careless wayfarer, with potentially disastrous consequences. This has been, in symbolic terms, the challenge of policy design as seen by the Israeli military planners during the long twilight period of warfare against terror, imposed on us since the autumn of 2000: Do too little, and terror might reign on Israeli streets. Do too much, in terms of the use of force against terror bases hidden amidst a civilian population, and the elaborate trap laid by Yasir Arafat-the escalation of Palestinian suffering so as to bring on massive external intervention, and the imposition of a solution based on the Arab interpretation of "international legitimacy"-would have been sprung. Not to mention our own moral anguish and internal divisions in the face of this dilemma! Despite occasional failures of judgment and errors, missteps on either side of the path, the IDF and the defense establishment can be said to have kept their balance-and to have found an effective way to walk the path and avoid both pitfalls. The pinpoint accuracy of recent strikes on terror operators in Gaza, in response to the Qassam rockets-all those killed in these air strikes were definitely identified as being directly involved in acts of war against Israeli civilians-testifies to the effort that goes into keeping this balance, based on highly accurate intelligence. A similar challenge-but this time transferred from the relatively precise military domain, where it will continue to be relevant, to the much murkier realm of economic and aid policy-now faces Israel as well as members of the international donor community. The latter has given, in recent years, more economic assistance per capita to the Palestinians than to any other people on earth. This has, in fact, evolved into a sense of entitlement. A Hamas spokesman, speaking to CNN-brazenly standing right in front of a poster glorifying bus bombings, a point that the network reporter elegantly avoided any reference to-claimed that the world should "respect the democratic outcome" by continuing to fund the PA as if nothing had happened. But something did happen: Instead of looking for a peaceful, liberal alternative to Fatah, the Palestinian people empowered a murderous terror organization. Despite the normal generous instinct to "give them the benefit of the doubt," the painful memories of recent years, the silent murmuring voices in the background of all of those children, women, and men who have been murdered under orders of Hamas leaders, as well as the virulent nature of Hamas's positions on the Jews (a recent quotation from the Hamas Web site-"we shall drink your blood"-can serve as a reminder) are there to warn us against any appeasement.
Once the active control of PA institutions has passed to Hamas functionaries, many of the complex cooperative arrangements which until now have governed the Israeli-PA relationship (and the parallel system of aid management by the U.S. and Europe) simply will cease to be. No money can flow to the PA coffers (tax and custom receipts will probably be held in escrow, for legal reasons); no security coordination (often based on sensitive intelligence) would be possible with people who owe their living to Hamas; no elaborate procedures to allow Palestinian workers to come daily to earn a living in Israel could be safe enough for the time being. The new government is bound to depend on a functional interaction with Israel and the West, if it is to succeed in delivering on its promises to the Palestinian public. But it must not be allowed to succeed; indeed, it must be shown to fail, unless and until it proves, in very concrete ways and by restating its identity in a dramatic fashion, that it has changed entirely and left behind, in perpetuity, its exterminatory ideology and terrorist practice. If softer standards are applied, the Israeli defense establishment feels, we shall soon face loopholes and "gray areas" leading to an unbowed Hamas, in power and in close coordination with Hizballah, Syria, and Iran. If Hamas decides to break the "hudna" ("calm") and resume large-scale violence (which it is not inclined to do, at this stage-the deterrent message seems to be working), the Israeli "menu" of responses would prove to be much harsher. The IDF is certainly not in favor of doing "too little" against Hamas, and at the political level, this line enjoys the cautious but firm support of Ehud Olmert, the acting prime minister. At the same time, the strictures against doing "too much" are equally in force. The Palestinian people will not be starved. There is an acute awareness among Israeli decision-makers, from within the IDF all the way to the highest national level, that for legal, moral, and strategic reasons, this would be a harmful and potentially disastrous outcome: Hamas would use it to radicalize popular opinion and blame Fatah as collaborators. Arab reactions might escalate and play into the hands of radical elements in the region, led by Iran. Internationally, a strangulation strategy would quickly erode the unprecedented backing Israel now enjoys and could lead to significant intervention in terms highly harmful to our interests. Can this circle be squared? Is there a foothold on the narrow path? At least in theory, the answer is yes: A careful use of existing connections and contacts could give Israeli planners an opportunity to "peel" the Hamas government off the people who may have voted for it-but still need to be offered an alternative way to keep their families alive. With a measure of creativity and good will, and based upon existing structures (much of the aid is already funneled through NGOs and aid agencies directly to recipients, often in kind and not in cash), the essential supplies could be kept flowing, while the huge governmental payroll is replaced by other sources of income, including new investments in industrial parks on the Palestinian side of the border and other private sector initiatives. After all, Hamas previously did the same to Fatah, by maintaining a parallel structure (da'awa, a "call to the faith," in effect, a separate social service and educational system). We are now called upon to help beat them at their own game.
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