AJC Mideast Briefing

The Russian Overture to Hamas: Behind the Outrage, Basic Divisions within the Quartet A Weekly Briefing on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs February 13, 2006 Dr. Eran Lerman Director Israel/Middle East Office Given the horrors suffered by innumerable innocent Russian citizens in recent years— from the theatre in Moscow to the school in Beslan—at the hands of murderous Chechen terrorists, the government of the Russian Federation should have been the last, not the first, to offer Hamas leaders the dramatic recognition implicit in the invitation to Moscow extended to them last week. President Vladimir Putin and his government chose to act, however, as if the blood of Israelis were cheap. The damage done to the prospects for effective action to isolate the terrorists—and to administer a lesson in the folly of voting for them—is probably irreparable. Moderate Palestinians are giving up the political endgame, and there are reports that President Mahmoud Abbas has already conceded control of the security forces to the would-be Hamas government. True, the Russians (and the French government, which expressed some understanding of the Russian step) still promise to take a firm stand with Hamas, demanding a commitment to recognize Israel's right to exist (formally, this would involve annulment of the Hamas Covenant, but this is hardly to be expected anytime soon); an end to terror; and recognition of the existing framework of agreements with Israel. But once a meeting is held before such undertakings are secured—and they have not been—the familiar dynamics of the slippery slope are bound to produce a situation in which none of these conditions will be met. Instead of recognition, Israel would face some murky halftones implying a temporary truce, for which we would be asked to pay with concrete concessions, while Hamas builds up the capacity to resume violence at the moment of their choice. Palestinian moderates, humiliated and marginalized, would recede into the background, and such limited gains that have been made toward a true historical reconciliation would fade for years to come. Why did Putin do it? Two possible explanations carry somewhat conspiratorial overtones: Moscow trying to propel itself once again into its Soviet posture of leading the anti-American camp; or alternatively, and somewhat less heroically, Russia hoping to buy off Islamist radicalism (given that there are more than 20 million Muslims in the Russian Federation, and many more in the "near abroad"). The fact that all of this coincided with the Russian government's decision to abandon its hitherto pro-Iranian stance and enable the nuclear issue to come before the UN Security Council may be the reason why American and even Israeli reactions to this perfidy have been somewhat muted. But the most troubling explanation may lie elsewhere. The Quartet was already divided as to basic premises, and what the Russians did was to preempt the action they expected others to take anyway. Reacting to an angry response by Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, his Russian counterpart simply asserted that sooner or later everyone would talk to Hamas—which may be a breathtaking example of a self-fulfilling prophesy, or simply an accurate read of the European climate of opinion. An almost knee-jerk reaction came from those who see the Arab-Israeli conflict as a zero-sum game, and thus, since they dislike Israeli and U.S. policies, line up once again as the Palestinians' advocates, in reaction to a firm Israeli and American stand against Hamas. This, apparently, was the logic used, in an internal Quartet debate, by former President Jimmy Carter, who led the team that observed the Palestinian elections and then, unsurprisingly, urged the Quartet to give Hamas a chance. In this scheme of things, shared by some—but not all—Europeans, and by certain voices in Israel itself, the cautions of history, of recent experience, and of strategic assessments—not to mention such outmoded notions of morality as outrage over the ascent of murderers to power-are all dismissed as narrow-minded folly; whereas what is served up as wisdom are two basic profundities: "Give them the benefit of the doubt. Political responsibility will change them." (And then, ultimately, "You make peace with your enemies, not with your friends.") But what if they do not change? Here the long shadows of the 1930s are at their longest. Yes, there are enmities—over land, borders, and specific interests—that can come to an end when the deeper (and practical) needs of the peoples on both sides are taken into consideration. But there are also, in the world of identity politics, situations in which exterminatory positions should be taken seriously; in which strategies are based on undying hatreds, and totalitarian systems force upon us a struggle for survival, in which all compromise is folly, because the other side is truly committed to our destruction, not to the welfare of its own people. This has been the nature of Hamas until now. The doubt is indeed there; but it is for them, not for us—given their history—to clear it away. "Israel is strong and rich. The Palestinians are weak and poor. Do not expect them to bear responsibility for their actions." This, with the best of intentions, is how the world allowed the Palestinian tragedy to fester and perpetuate itself—namely, by absolving them of the measure of responsibility that would have prepared them for life in the real world, where suboptimal compromises, not fantasies about the destruction of the other, are the real currency of political life. To reinforce the notion that the world owes them a living, with no conditions attached (after all, no people in the world have received more economic aid per capita, all of which has melted without a trace of responsible investment) is to endanger once again the opportunity, which has now emerged, to send a message to the Palestinian people: Actions, even your actions, have consequences. Here is another way to put the same message. Not everything that happens in this world is simply a "Zionist conspiracy" designed to ruin the Palestinians. On the contrary, Israel stands ready to provide vital supplies (often unpaid for); opportunities for work; an outlet for Palestinian exports, sometimes prioritized over those of Israeli farmers. A visit to the Erez and Karni crossings (which we hope to arrange for the AJC Board of Governors in March) is enough to demonstrate how much effort and dedication by Israeli officers, soldiers, and civilians has been put into making this possible. But if Hamas and what it stands for were truly a strategic choice, not just a capricious reaction against Fatah corruption, then the mission of doing all of this—without assisting a terrorist government —would become very delicate indeed; and the consequences may turn out to be quite serious. It may well be, of course, that such rational arguments will do little to dissuade those who have already decided to speak to Hamas and to absolve the Palestinians of all responsibility. Here, then, is a less rational but pointedly political argument: If this drift continues—if, instead of a community of like-minded nations standing with them, Israelis come to feel that once again they have been betrayed by a hostile world—a key element in the present strategy of the centrist camp will be undone. The beneficiaries will be the parties of the right and the far right, who already survey everything that has happened here since 1993 with a thin, bitter smile: "We told you so."

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