AJC Mideast Briefing

More than Meets the Eye: A Broad Range of Decisions     Crowds the Israeli Defense Establishment’s Agenda A Weekly Briefing on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs February 27, 2006 Dr. Eran Lerman Director Israel/Middle East Office As the country cruises toward a crucial vote on March 28—with the polls so far indicating a clear win for Kadima, the new party founded by Ariel Sharon and now led by Ehud Olmert—there is a daunting list of decisions to be made in the broad field of Israeli national security. Driven by new threats, old constraints, and emerging opportunities, some of the issues are urgent enough to require immediate action. Others would be better left to the discretion of the newly elected cabinet and some likely new decision-making mechanisms, which are bound to put together (through the messy political process of coalition-building) within weeks of the elections. The professional level, in any case, is already weighing the options it will soon be asked to present; and loud rumblings of internal disagreements, indicating the intensity of what is at stake, can be heard, not only by the discerning ear, as some major disputes seep out into the public domain. Obviously, the most immediate challenge is what to do about the Palestinian Authority, now that Hamas seems set to dominate it. The attempts by the public faces of Hamas, such as Prime Minister-designate Isma'il Haniya, to present a "pragmatic" prospect to the worried Western (and Israeli) donor community amount, at best, to an offer of a prolonged ceasefire—conditional upon the "restitution of Palestinian rights," i.e., not only a withdrawal to the 1967 lines, but a recognition of the so-called "right of return." Even this subtle design for the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state is too much for other voices in Hamas councils, who adhere to the line suggested by their ally in Tehran and reject any possibility of negotiations with the "Zionist entity." Practically no one in a position of responsibility in Israel sees any prospect of finding common ground with these positions; the debate revolves around the best way to contain and ultimately defeat the Hamas challenge. At this stage, it is a battle about funds and aid — although, if the Qassam "drizzle" from Gaza begins to take a toll in lives, military measures may also come into play. From outside the government, the Labor Party leader, Amir Peretz, has called for aid to be channeled to President Mahmoud Abbas (largely in line with the European position), so as to empower him in his constitutional dispute with the Hamas-dominated legislature. Israel's present government, however—namely, Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzippi Livni—is wary of falling into the trap of allowing Abbas to serve as the smiling countenance of a terrorist-dominated government. There are signs of tensions with the U.S. State Department over this issue (while other voices in Washington seem to support a hard line). At the same time, Olmert and Livni are also keen to maintain, as an important political asset, the sense of coherent international solidarity with Israel, which was one of the major gains secured by the Disengagement. The government is therefore willing to contemplate a measured, incremental approach, with special attention given to the need to avoid a humanitarian crisis on the Palestinian side, which will soon face a financial crisis (and has already defaulted on payments for oil and gas). Within the IDF, on the other hand, the main concern is that under the luring calm of a prolonged ceasefire, Hamas, in power, would forge a firm alliance with Iran, Hizballah, and Syria, reviving old fears about Israel's eastern front; hence the need, as the IDF and the intelligence community see it, to push as fast and as effectively as possible to bring down the Hamas government and to demonstrate to the Palestinian people the folly of their choice. So far, Olmert has chosen a carefully calibrated middle ground, despite open criticism from both left and right; but the internal differences—at times, differences of nuance; at times, disagreement on the level of first principles—are bound to persist. Such differences should be viewed against the background of a much larger set of issues and the growing concern, within the IDF and the defense establishment, that a shrinking allocation of resources is beginning to take its toll on fighting capabilities while the threats are accumulating rather than diminishing. Despite the ongoing conflict with Palestinian terror groups and the danger of a crisis in the north that could erupt on short notice, the Defense budget has been cut since 2002 from $8.2 billion (in current dollars) to nearly $7 billion; and despite promises by Sharon that the line would be held at this level, there is a growing concern that pressures for social reform—fighting the scourge of poverty, which has come into political focus in recent years—would continue to take their toll. This budgetary pressure has enhanced the need to review several fundamental and doctrinal aspects of the Israeli defense "creed." Studies and debates were generated simultaneously by the IDF itself, under the watchful eye of Lt.-General Dan Halutz, who in long years of service in the Air Force acquired highly penetrating and self-critical managerial habits; by a specially appointed blue-ribbon committee, chaired by former Minister Dan Meridor, which may soon submit its (secret) recommendations; and by think tanks, scholars and op-ed writers in the major papers. As a result, a number of "sacred cows" may come under the knife; and a broad range of issues can be expected to be reconsidered in terms that may be unfamiliar, or even acceptable, to an older generation of Israelis: Who will serve, and for how long? The powerful and formative egalitarian role of military service in Israeli society—a democratic and creative Athens, but with a Spartan ethos—has been cast into doubt for some time already; not only because of the widening loopholes, allowing ultra-Orthodox young men not to serve, but also because the new modalities of warfare mean that only 20 percent or so of all men, and a much smaller proportion of women, now serve in fighting units (and remain attached to them later in life as reservists). The other 80 percent are largely in supportive roles—and so the IDF hardly ever calls them for reserve service. Thus, the core group of combat soldiers carries a disproportionate share of the burden. Still, for economic reasons, a decision has now been taken by the government to shorten the service of all noncombatant men by eight months (to 28 months); combat soldiers—and sailors—would serve 32 months, the last four of them with full pay, instead of the few hundred shekels they now get. The more dramatic option—shifting the entire IDF to a voluntary, fully paid force, as is done in the U.S. and much of the West—has been given currency in some academic studies and was weighed by the IDF, but rejected for broad moral, ideological, social, and even economic reasons: The ability to recruit the brightest young minds for computer and intelligence work proved in recent years to be crucial, not only for the IDF, but for the future of Israeli industry, as it produces the "social capital" for the operational kernels of tomorrow's high-tech start-ups. Even so, the changing nature of the military burden is bound to have an impact on Israeli society, to an extent that at this stage is still hard to predict. What is the true threat of reference? This question, which has a bearing not only on force structures and doctrines, but also on which might be the necessary lines of defense to the east, and the defensive posture toward Egypt, has been in dispute over the years (Israel and the U.S. disagree, for example, on the inclusion of Egypt in the "qualitative edge" equations); but given the recent degree of de-stabilization in the region, the IDF is now concerned that even Israel's peace partners may become risks, or worse. Two of our two-star generals, in quick succession, have managed to anger the neighbors by speaking to nonmilitary audiences about their worries: First, the GOC Central Command, Major General Yair Naveh, offered his opinion (with journalists present!) that King Abdullah II may be the last Hashemite on the throne, as most of his subjects are Palestinians (and Olmert was obliged to inform the King that this was by no means the official position of Israel.) Then Deputy Chief of Staff Moshe Kaplinsky hinted at a meeting with a business group that there are early signs of instability in Egypt. Both have been reprimanded, but the fears they expressed are not theirs alone. A closely related issue is whether the American "project" in the region is an asset or a liability: The hopes generated in 2003 have long ago faded, and the recent Hamas "fiasco" has broken the dams of reticence and elicited angry criticism of American policy from the very heart of the Israeli defense establishment (including a recorded comment by the head of the Security Service, Yuval Diskin, that we may yet "miss Saddam"). The feeling is that, while the drive for democratization is well-meant, elections have been pushed forward far too early, and failures of competence as well as of strategy are now bringing turmoil to our doorstep—increasing, rather than diminishing, the threats we face. Should we abandon nuclear ambiguity? Given these dramatic changes, combined with the prospect of international failure to contain the Iranian nuclear effort, some (mostly still outside government circles) are raising the question of Israel's nuclear posture and suggesting that the policy of ambiguity, endorsed for strategic and diplomatic reasons since the 1960s, may soon cease to be relevant. The fear of igniting a regional arms race will be rendered meaningless once Iran has the bomb, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia follow suit; and the lessons of the Indian shift to an overt capability are interesting. The traditional and powerful counterarguments are still in force, however—the best of them being that a successful policy that helped keep us safe for years should better be left alone; and a real debate will await the outcome of the Iranian crisis (which no one expects to be resolved through the good offices of the Russian initiative). Finally, and in conjunction with the latter, there is the question of closer Israeli association with NATO, which has been stirred up recently at both ends-with the former prime minister of Spain, José Maria Aznar, and the present defense minister of Italy, as well as the Israeli ambassador to NATO and the EU, Oded Eran, suggesting the prospect of full membership. Surely, if the flags of former Soviet republics (or rather, captive nations)—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—now flutter in the Brussels wind, why not ours, when we have so much more to offer? The answer on the NATO end—that the Palestinian conflict must be solved first-now looks weaker than ever. (Is it our fault that the Palestinians elected murderers?) Nevertheless, there are strong Israeli reasons, at this stage, to aim somewhat lower, where our decision-making process will remain free of the burdens of Brussels bureaucrats. Given the scope for bilateral dialogue now offered by NATO's Istanbul Cooperative Initiative of June 2004 (which includes cooperation on such practical matters as counterterrorist efforts, border security, and disaster preparedness) and Israeli maritime participation in "Operation Active Endeavor" to fight terrorism in the Mediterranean, further steps toward a "Partnership for Peace" model, or even a Swedish-like semi-association, are now in sight—with all that this change will entail in terms of a new sense of interaction with a once-hostile world taking hold at the very core of Israel's strategic community.

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