| | Palestinian Permutations—and Israeli Political Responses: What Can We Expect after the Elections?
A Weekly Briefing on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs
March 6, 2006 Dr. Eran Lerman
Director Israel/Middle East Office A thick pall of uncertainty envelops the Palestinian arena at this point in time. Can Hamas "change" (or effectively pretend to change)? The answer from Moscow, so far as can be ascertained, is no, and the vague phrases used by President Vladimir Putin in his long telephone conversation with Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert—"in a negotiation, you always deal with someone on the other side whose positions are difficult"—cannot hide this simple fact. Russia, perhaps egged on by some European elements, has tried, and failed, to get Hamas to adhere to the three basic demands of the Quartet: recognition of Israel's right to exist (what a shame to still be chasing such a recognition from the mouth of murderers!); respecting existing agreements; disarming the terrorist arm of the movement, the `Iz Al-Din Al-Qassam Battalions. The likelihood that the Republic of South Africa, based on "the lessons of the transition from apartheid to democracy" (not exactly a reassuring simile from an Israeli point of view), would succeed where Russia failed seems forlorn. As the wave of anti-Western, anti-Danish, anti-American, and anti-Semitic bile continues to lap the shores of Muslim communities everywhere, fed by the organized hate media and literature fostered by the Muslim Brotherhood, on the one hand, and by Iran, on the other (and in the case of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Khalid Al-Mish`al, hand in hand), there is little prospect, despite some internal dissent and tension that have a slight reflection in public statements, of Hamas bowing to the realities of their people's needs and accepting an entirely new frame of reference. Mish`al, so far overruling any attempt to suggest a more flexible line, hopes to be able to rely on Iranian support (not so easy: there are ways of preventing a nominal aid package in dollars from reaching the shekel accounts of the PA, and there is no independent Palestinian currency or banking system). As long as he and his movement stay within Iran's orbit, the likelihood of implementation of the Road Map requirements is as good, as one Israeli with a peculiar sense of humor put it, as that of finding a pork sausage stand in a B'nei B'rak yeshiva. What now, then? The questions involved run very deep. Indeed, they require an assessment of what "power" means in a semi-sovereign entity such as the PA, and who wields it. Did Hamas really come to power by winning the elections, when many of the tools of governance are in the hands of the presidency and the movement lacks the two-thirds majority in Parliament necessary for constitutional change? On the other hand, can a pleasant but ineffectual figure such as President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) consolidate an alternative base of power, relegating Hamas to the role of parliamentary obstructionists? There are, essentially, three scenarios possible on the Palestinian side, and it is very difficult to predict at this time the trajectory of events as one of them—or more, in quick succession—might be chosen: - A crisis in the short term: If Abbas, as president, were to stand firm (as he seemed to do, at least verbally, in his meeting with Labor Party leader Amir Peretz this week), and refuse to seat a Hamas-led government unless it accepts at least the legitimacy of all existing agreements with Israel (precisely what Ahmadinehjad counseled Mish'al not to do), there may arise a constitutional standoff lasting weeks or months, and perhaps ultimately leading to new elections. This is not at all a cost-free option: Israel would be put under heavy pressure to reward such brave behavior by offering an enticing vision of the Permanent Status agreement, and by curtailing responses to terror attacks (which Hamas, now highly disciplined and "calm," might renew). Still, this at least would have the benefit of bringing the internal contradictions of the Palestinian position out into the open. But does Abbas have it in him to do so? Nothing in his record so far supports that assumption, as Foreign Minister Tzippi Livni carefully pointed out a few days ago.
- A prolonged "cohabitation," with all questions still open: This assumes that Abbas would consent to a Hamas-led government taking power—perhaps with a Fatah component (although the Fatah parliamentary faction rejected the offer) or with nonpartisan "experts" and technocrats in key positions—without an answer to the pending questions; but with important functions, such as control of the security forces and the national media, held by the presidency, and a constant rearguard action being fought to prevent Hamas from subverting other institutions (such as, for example, the changes—minor as they were—that have, in fact, been put into some Palestinian school textbooks under European pressure). This will enable Abbas to say that he is doing "something," but real power over many aspects of Palestinian life will have passed into Hamas hands. This is, in many ways, the most likely outcome, and the most complicated in political and even moral terms (as viewed from Israel, and from the West). It is bound to hasten the erosion of the international front against Hamas and pose daily challenges, not only to Israel, but to our Egyptian and Jordanian neighbors, as the Palestinian arena becomes the testing ground for the relative powers of nationalism vs. Islamism. Its one great benefit, however, may be the likelihood of a prolonged hudna—as neither side in the game would be eager to force Israel's hand by re-launching the campaign of terror.
- A Hamas takeover, with Abbas resigned to marginality (or resigning): Not the movement's first choice, in all likelihood—they seem eager to have others share with them the burdensome duties of governance, given the very real economic crunch that is already felt, particularly among the huge number of wage earners in the bloated "security forces"—but a very real possibility, if no partners are found. Yet Abbas might decide to shy away from active measures and allow Ismail Haniya (who is little more than the smiling face, a former personal assistant of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, representing the collective decision-making bodies of the movement) to take office.
The choices are, essentially, in Palestinian hands, and open Israeli or American interventions—at this stage—are unlikely to have the desired impact (probably the reverse). The wise thing to do, at this particular moment, would be to sit tight and watch the various Palestinian factions grapple with their dilemmas. Moreover, the larger questions as to the future course for Israel would be better left for a time when we may have a better sense of where the PA is headed. But these are idle expectations at election time, when the slide in Kadima's standing is attributed to its reactive pose and its leaders' lack of coherence about future plans. Hence the array of vocal Israeli responses, roughly corresponding to the scenario that seems most likely to the key players—or better suits their political predispositions: - On the left, the dominant notion is that Abu Mazen remains a partner; Yossi Beilin has even suggested that Israel should continue to deal with him as chairman of the PLO (the original partner, in the Oslo process) and ignore altogether the PA, which is a transitory entity with no international standing. Others, such as Gidi Greenstein's Reut Institute, warn against this as a political trap and call for a refocusing of attention on the PA, which is the proper address not only for Israel, but also for the Quartet's Road Map requirements; it is indeed in Israel's interest to redefine the PA as an "embryonic state" with at least some responsibilities shifting to its shoulders. In any case, the Labor Party position is that there is common ground—against terror, the "mutual enemy"—with the PA president, and hence the need to avoid the destruction of those institutions that might yet be useful, if and when he decides to stand up to Hamas.
- On the right, the working assumption (now supported by the embittered opinions of former Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon, who feels vindicated in his warning that the Disengagement would put wind in the sails of terrorism) is the worst-case scenario: The PA is an enemy, possibly a mortal danger (Ehud Olmert's attempt to lessen the level of threat was met with derision), and a very strong hand is necessary if we are to reverse the perceived decline in our willingness to hold on to our own. No further rewards can or should be offered; and Israel should restore its deterrence while awaiting a change of heart (and a new model of politics?) on the other side.
- Finally, for Olmert—and for the most important voice in Kadima in recent days, that of Avi Dichter, the effective and hard-bitten former head of the Security Service, the Shin Bet (now number five on the list, and possibly the man Ariel Sharon wanted as his future defense minister)—this is the time to make it clear to the public (and the world) that there is no longer any point in pretending that the Road Map can be made to work. Once Hamas is in power, even if Abbas succeeds in holding them off in a prolonged and debilitating constitutional crisis, there will be no real hope of getting even to Stage I. Hence the need to start planning, as soon as possible, for Disengagement 2007, along the lines already outlined by Sharon (but later abandoned in favor of "Gaza first"): leaving the IDF in control on the ground, but dismantling the settlements along Route 60, rationalizing the lines of defense, and offering the Palestinians a prospect of future contiguity on the West Bank—if (a big if) terror ends, and the IDF too will feel safe enough to withdraw.
For this strategy to be of value, it needs to be closely coordinated with the U.S. administration (which, as viewed from Israel, is not yet of one mind on this, and seems reluctant, at this delicate point—with Iran on the table—to let go of the Road Map, shared by Europe, the UN, and Russia). As tensions rise in the post-election era, as they are almost bound to do—given the gravity of the issues at stake-the commitment and support of Israel's friends in the American arena will fast become as important as they have ever been. | |
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