Pitfalls in American Diplomacy
North Korean strongman Kim Jong Il used his two hostages (through phone calls he permitted them to make to their families) to say that former President Clinton would be an acceptable interlocutor for their release, but Al Gore would not be. Mr. Clinton was a prop in Kim Jong Il's photo op and may or may not have talked about the nuclear weapons impasse - he says not; they say yes. The administration insists the trip was "private" and the United States hasn't "talked" to North Korea at all.
How silly. Former presidents, married to current Secretaries of State, have no private lives, and why would the Obama Administration not want to acknowledge its hand in protecting American citizens abroad? There is no reason NOT to talk to North Korea or Iran or any hostile party - the obvious caveats being: a) clearly conveying American requirements for future improved relations, including clearly stating what behavior is unacceptable and what sanctions as well as what benefits might accrue; b) having reason to believe "the other" can and will be responsive to the required changes; and c) not paying in advance.
It is one of the Obama Administration's periodic straw men to say that the Bush Administration didn't engage Iran, or North Korea or Iraq before the invasion. American administrations have talked to everyone over the years - Stalin and Khrushchev at the height of the Cold War; the North Vietnamese while they were killing American soldiers; Khomeini and every other Iranian leader of the past 30 years; Saddam Hussein; and Kim Jong Il. Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon through Bush 41, Clinton and Bush 43, we have talked to everyone. And should - it provides moments of wonderful clarity. Secretary of State George Schultz memorably told Syrian President Hafez Assad, "The quality of the opposition counts."
The problem arises when Americans can't make a clear, convincing case for our own position, or when we think we have to agree with our adversaries. Or have to agree that their worldview is at least acceptable. Or mistakenly ascribe our own world view and our own goals to them, and then assume they actually want to go where we want them to go. Or assume they can even if they want to.
Those last three are the biggest pitfalls in American diplomacy.
To assume that North Korea or Iran don't really want to be nuclear powers for their own reasons is unwarranted. To assume Hamas - or Fatah - would accept a rump state of Palestine squeezed between Israel and Jordan as the full expression of Palestinian nationalism is unrealistic. To believe only a smile and an apology for American history stands between the United States and a Hugo Chávez or Raúl Castro that promote free speech and democracy is naïve - to assume they agree that anything but their own continued power is the goal is also naïve. To believe Abu Mazen can bring the Palestinian movement to a verifiable acceptance of the legitimacy of Jewish sovereignty - or that he wants to - is unfounded.
The policy of the U.S. government should be to talk with whomever we believe would advance our agenda, being clear on both the agenda and the partners' ability to respond.
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