JINSA Report #508 Disengaging

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August 10, 2005

JINSA Report #508

Disengaging

One of JINSA's cardinal rules is that decisions of the democratically
elected Government of Israel must be respected and should not be
undermined – not by JINSA and not by the Government of the United
States. Hence, our lack of comment on Israel's planned disengagement
from Gaza. We can, however, raise questions, worry about the
consequences for Israel and for the U.S.-Israel security relationship
and – most importantly – complain about our own government's finger
stuck in someone else's eye.

We were supporters of Prime Minister Sharon's announcement in 2003 that
Israel, having no Palestinian "partner" for negotiations, was unwilling
to wait any longer for one to emerge and would undertake unilateral
steps to secure Israel's future. The benefits, in our view, were three:
a) Israel was in a war the Palestinians started and the government's
obligation to secure the public is fundamental; b) Israel was likely to
cede Gaza under some future agreement anyhow, and there might be a quid
pro quo from the U.S. for doing it now (such as the 14 April 2004 Bush
letter on defensible borders); and c) the Palestinians might conclude
that they had a lot to lose and decide to participate constructively.

All fair points, but if Mr. Sharon believed he could control the process
as it unfolded, it appears he was mistaken. As the undefined
"unilateral" Israeli actions became the well-defined "disengagement from
Gaza," the centrifugal forces that spin all political and military
operations away from the center came into play, producing Oslo redux.

In 1993, then-Prime Minster Rabin began a perfectly reasonable process.
The Oslo Accord and its successors aren't bad documents; they have
checks and balances and don't require much more of Israel than of the
Palestinians. But the Israeli government seems truly to have believed it
would be able to stop or reverse course if the Palestinians proved
unable to deliver. An Israeli general told JINSA that Israel wouldn't
"permit" the Palestinians to do this or that or some other thing.
Someone said, "The Palestinians won't ask permission. What are you going
to do when they've done what they 'aren't permitted' to do?" He replied,
"Then no one would fault us if we stop the process." Yeah, right.

Events spun out as the U.S. developed a vested interest in "success,"
defined as continuing the "peace process," not the legitimacy and
security for Israel that the Accords promised. The Clinton
Administration had no leverage over Arafat, so it demanded that Israel
not only fulfill its part of the Oslo bargain, but also "help" the
Palestinians fulfill theirs. Oslo was over in 1996 when the Palestinian
"police" opened fire on Israeli forces in Jerusalem. There was much
discussion after that of "American pressure" on Israel to continue the
"Oslo process," which wasn't buried until 2001. Of course there was
pressure.

As there is today. The Bush Administration has staked its claim to what
constitutes "success," and is insisting that Israel not only withdraw,
but "make" Gaza and the Palestinian Authority (PA) viable in spite of
itself and its nasty proclivities. Since the PA is continuing its war
against Israel even as it sinks into lawlessness, this pressure
constitutes an unacceptable intrusion into Israel's sovereign right to
determine the security parameters, and borders, within which it can
safely live.

To view this JINSA Report online click on the link below.
http://www.jinsa.org/JINSAReports/3118

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