Renewed Threats from the PKK

Contact: Jim Colbert
August 10, 2005
(202) 667-3900

Renewed Threats from the PKK: Implications for Turkey, Iraq and the U.S.

On August 4, 2005, JINSA convened a panel of experts to discuss what
role the U.S. can and should play in the battle against the resurgent
Kurdish terrorist organization known as the PKK (Partiya Karkaren
Kurdistan). The timing of the panel coincided with the second trilateral
meeting on the PKK attended by Turkish, American, and Iraqi officials
held the same week in Washington D.C.

The panel, moderated by Alan Makovsky (House International Relations
Committee; former Director, Turkish Research Program at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy), featured Michael Rubin (American
Enterprise Institute; former Political Advisor, Coalition Provisional
Authority in Baghdad) and Rear Admiral John Sigler, USN (ret.)
(participant of the 2004 JINSA Flag & General Officers Trip to Turkey;
former Plans and Policy Officer for the United States Central Command).

JINSA's Executive Director, Tom Neumann, reiterated JINSA's
long-standing view that the PKK is a terrorist organization, no
different than al-Qaeda, Hamas, or Hizballah. "Lately, we've been
critical of the policies of the ruling Justice and Development Party
(known by its Turkish acronym AKP) vis-à-vis Syria and Iran; and the
rise of anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism in Turkey. However, we want
to be clear about where we stand on the PKK," added Neumann. JINSA
convened the panel at a crucial time of increasing PKK attacks within
Turkey to demonstrate the destabilizing effects of this terrorist
organization and to call upon the U.S. to take actions to defeat the PKK.

Sigler led off by explaining the role the military can play in the realm
of counterterrorism and action against the PKK. According to Sigler,
counterterrorism is primarily a special operations mission. The problem
with using special operations units, Sigler said, is that they are
engaged in conflicts all over the world. Sigler referred to them as
"low density and high demand," meaning that there are simply not enough
of them to go around. In dealing with the PKK, Sigler noted that the
military encounters geographical command problems. Turkey, for example
is under European Command while Iraq falls under Central Command. He
stated that close cooperation between these two command structures is
critical in gaining Turkish confidence for U.S. action against the PKK.

According to Sigler, the way the United States views the PKK problem
does not coincide with Turkey's view. The two countries have many
overlapping security and strategic interests but there are some
fundamental differences with respect to the PKK. Turkey views the PKK
threat as "grave" and " potentially existential," while the U.S. views
the PKK as a problem within its bilateral relationship with Turkey, the
U.S.-led war against terrorism, and as a problem that could effect the
outcome in Iraq. According to Sigler, "cooperation on this issue is a
strategic imperative." He believes that the U.S. must act on the
problem because it coincides with its national self-interest as well as
being important in its fight against terrorism. Sigler also stated that
action is imperative because the U.S. has a moral obligation to
stability in Iraq. "Let's not make the same mistake about planning for
the future that we've made in the recent past. If we see a problem,
let's act on it now before it becomes too big of a problem to act on."

Michael Rubin next addressed the large and attentive crowd. "There are
no if's, and's, or but's, the PKK is a terrorist group." He mentioned
that unfortunately, this is not necessarily the view of all European
policymakers. Rubin also made it clear that the PKK is a very small
group and that it does not represent Kurds in Turkey, nor does it
represent Kurds in Iraq. There are about 4000 PKK terrorists in Iraq
and around 400 to 500 of them are hardened killers. The PKK, Rubin
noted, is unpopular in Iraq and most Iraqi Kurds remain upset with them.
He believes that, other than the constitutional debates, the biggest
diplomatic hurdle to federalism in Iraq is the continued presence of the
PKK, and according to Rubin, the decision to completely rid Iraq of the
PKK will ultimately fall on the Iraqis themselves. Rubin maintained
that he continues to hear the same diplomatic rhetoric about the PKK
from the United States without seeing any action and this undercuts the
global war on terrorism. He referred to the PKK's most recent actions
in the Mediterranean as "not only terrorism and bombing but flat out
economic warfare by a group that should have been shut down a long time
ago."

While Rubin was very clear that the U.S. must take action, he also spoke
about measures the Turkish government should take to assist the U.S.
Rubin argued that one of the most important things Turkey can do is to
instruct its officials to cease making the argument that Hamas has
earned legitimacy because of the political problems it encounters.
These kinds of arguments undermine Turkey's war on terrorism because
terrorism is never legitimate under any circumstances. Rubin also noted
that it was surprising that the Turkish government recently invited
Bashar Assad to vacation in Turkey. This legitimizes a Syrian
government, Rubin argued, that is responsible for the deaths of 30,000
Turks and is the largest sponsor of the PKK. "Turkey needs to be a lot
more consistent in its definition of terrorism across the board, in
Turkey and elsewhere, and more importantly, the United States needs to
mean what it promises because actions, not words, are going to be what
defeats this terrorist scourge," Rubin stated in conclusion.

Alan Makovsky kicked-off the question and answer period with a few of
his own questions for both Rubin and Sigler. His first question to
Michael Rubin dealt with the reasoning behind why the United States has
not taken stronger action against the PKK and what he believes will come
out of the recent trilateral meetings in Washington. According to
Rubin, President Bush wants to take action against the PKK but military
planners have consistently told him that these actions were still in the
planning stages. Rubin believes that the problem lies in a lack of
coordination in stressing this issue as a threat to our war on
terrorism. He also explained that the Turks are pragmatic in the sense
that they understand U.S. limitations, but they do want some kind of
gesture that the U.S. takes this issue seriously. Rubin suggested that
an effective gesture would involve taking out a few important PKK
figures or eliminate one particular cell. He also explained that it is
important for Turkey to focus on only the issue of the PKK when dealing
with the U.S. Rubin feels that if the focus is kept on the issue of the
PKK, the U.S. will not become sidetracked on other Turkish issues.
Ultimately, "coordination is key," Rubin said, stressing the need to
convince Iraqis to cooperate with the U.S. and Turkey against the PKK.

The first of Makovsky's questions to Sigler involved Turkey's right of
hot pursuit with regard to the PKK. Sigler responded that the U.S. can
only urge Turkey not to pursue the PKK on their own but noted that it is
important for the U.S. to take action against the PKK before this
becomes an issue. Makovsky then asked Admiral Sigler about where he
believes the PKK in Iraq stands in terms of priority in the eyes of the
U.S. Sigler maintained that although the PKK is a high priority, the
issue regarding the U.S. has less to do with priorities in Iraq and more
to do with priorities around the world. He reiterated that fighting the
PKK would be a special operations mission and that these forces have
many duties in the global war on terror. He did say that in his
opinion, it would be more important, given the destabilizing potential
of the PKK, to take special operations forces from other regions and use
them to fight the PKK. Rubin added that the window of opportunity opens
during the winter when the PKK, who generally inhabit the mountains,
need to come down to purchase supplies. The panel agreed that there is
enough time from now until winter to formulate a plan, and hoped that
the trilateral talks happening now could bring about some kind of action
in the near future.

A representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), who was
also present at the meeting, commented that the PKK is a serious problem
for them. The representative explained that one of the most important
problems the PKK presents is that it impedes the Iraq's relations with
Turkey. He mentioned that increasing boarder security between Iraq,
Iran and, Turkey, which is almost nonexistent now, would be an important
step in taking action against the PKK.

Rapporteur's summary by JINSA Research Assistant James Cetrone.

# # #

The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs is an independent,
non-partisan educational organization established in 1976 to educate the
public on national and international security issues, including the
importance of an effective U.S. defense capability and the key role of
strategic allies, including Israel, to promote democratic values in the
Middle East.
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Tel: (202) 667-3900 Fax: (202) 667-0601
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