JINSA Report #519 "Or Else," What?

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September 23, 2005

JINSA Report #519

"Or Else," What?

Iran's "president" Ahmadinejad has upped the nuclear ante. Last week at
the UN, he announced Iran's "right" as a signatory to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty to nuclear technology and "right" to share it
with other (Islamic) signatories. This week, in a parade marking the
start of "Sacred Defense Week," Iran's ballistic missiles were displayed
with banners saying, "We will crush America under our feet," and "Israel
must be wiped off the face of the earth." The fact that the Defense
Attachés of Italy, France, Greece and Poland walked out of the parade in
protest was a good thing, but less interesting than the fact that they
were in attendance in the first place.

The American administration wants to have Iran's nuclear program
referred to the UN Security Council; Russia, China and the EU do not.
We agree with the Russians, Chinese and Europeans. What does the
administration think Security Council would do? In the movie Team
America, the Hans Blix puppet visits the Kim Jong Il puppet and demands
to see North Korea's hidden nuclear facilities. "We must be firm with
you. Let me see your whole palace – or else," says HB. "Or else what?"
asks KJI. "Or else we'll be very angry with you. And we will write you
a letter and tell you how angry we are."

It would be better to fail to refer the issue to the Security Council
and have everyone think we are impotent to deal politically with rogue
states with nuclear weapons, than to refer it and have everyone KNOW we are.

Furthermore, while there is still loose talk about American or Israeli
military action to "take out" Iranian nuclear facilities, there is in
fact no "Osirak option." The best intelligence we have indicates that
facilities are scattered throughout the country, and in many cases are
buried and/or hardened. While military action cannot and should not be
taken off the table, the logistical difficulty of removing Iran's
nuclear capabilities is more difficult by orders of magnitude than the
problem that existed in 1981 in Iraq.

So what to do? Regime change in Iran was always our best option.
President Bush has said there are three possible mechanisms for change.
A government can change aspects of itself. Libya's divestiture of WMD
is an example; unfortunately it was not accompanied by political
liberalization. The people can overthrow or undermine a dictatorial
system. Ukraine's Orange Revolution, and possibility that the crack in
the Egyptian system will be widened with the upcoming elections are
examples. Or, a regime can be ousted by outside force.

Since the first option is hard enough to imagine for Iran and the third
is even harder, we are left with finding ways to help the Iranian people
overthrow their dictators. We have taken steps around the edges, but we
have to do more to convince the Iranian people that we stand with them,
and to convince the mullahs that there is an "or else" at the end of our
demand that they give up their search for nuclear weapons capability.
The "or else" is that they will face the anger of their own people – a
far more frightening possibility than a letter from the Security Council.

To view this JINSA Report online click on the link below.
http://www.jinsa.org/JINSAReports/3165

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